The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan by Tobias, Carl W.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1992
The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan
Carl W. Tobias
University of Richmond, ctobias@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 Mont. L. Rev. 91 (1992)
THE MONTANA FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE PLAN 
Carl Tobias* 
The Montana Federal District Court and thirty-three other 
federal districts recently took steps to qualify as Early Implemen-
tation District Courts (EIDC) under the Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990. 1 The Montana District completed the development of its 
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, which also includes 
numerous proposed amendments of the local rules necessary to im-
plement the plan, before the December 31, 1991 statutory dead-
line. In the last issue of this journal, I analyzed the work that pre-
ceded development of the plan.2 I examined the efforts of the 
Advisory Group to Implement the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
(Group) and its August 1991 report to the Montana District Court. 
I also criticized certain aspects of the recommendations that the 
Group made in its report. The plan includes numerous concepts 
that should improve civil justice in the Montana Federal District 
Court. Nevertheless, I believe that some features of the plan could 
prove problematic for judicial officers, lawyers and litigants in the 
Montana District and that a few may even increase delay and ex-
pense. Those dimensions of the plan that I consider most troubling 
are the focus of this essay. 
The plan that the Montana Federal District Court published 
in December, 1991, is essentially an abbreviated version of the re-
port that the Advisory GrOll;P submitted to the Montana federal 
judges last August. The plan includes numerous suggestions for 
change in the local rules that are to be adopted formally when im-
plementing the plan's provisions. The plan is scheduled to become 
fully effective in April, 1992, so that the public should have ade-
quate time to comment on the court's proposals to change the local 
rules to effectuate the plan. The Montana Federal District Court, 
with the Advisory Group's assistance, concluded "that a system of 
differential case management centered on the active and informed 
participation of both counsel and a judicial officer in the develop-
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Derik Pomeroy, Lucy 
Rudbach and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer for processing this 
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I., Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1990)). See also Donna Stienstra, Districts That 
Submitted CJRA Advisory Group Reports and Delay Reduction Plans By December 31, 
1991 (Feb. 29, 1992) (list compiled for Federal Judicial Center) (copy on file with author). 
See generally Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Ciuil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992). 
2. See Tobias, Federal Court Procedural Reform, 52 MONT. L. REV. 433, 437-51 (1991). 
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ment of a case-specific management plan will ensure the civil liti-
gation process accomplishes its intended purpose, i.e., the fair and 
efficient disposition of civil disputes."3 The court intends to assess 
the efficacy of provisions in the plan on a continuing basis and, 
with the help of the Advisory Group, evaluate periodically the con-
dition of the court's criminal and civil docket. The Montana Fed-
eral District Court also will alter the plan if conditions so indicate 
to improve continually the district's civil justice system. 
It is incumbent upon Montana attorneys who practice in the 
federal court to analyze and comment on the plan. If the plan is 
implemented as proposed, it will significantly change the character 
of federal court practice, particularly lawyers' understanding and 
development of their cases and judicial officers' management of 
lawsuits from filing to disposition." The public will have a forty-
five day period for comment on the plan and the local rules, and 
the judges will have an opportunity to analyze that public input 
and make changes as warranted. The plan and the local rules that 
implement it are scheduled to take effect on April 1, 1992. 
Of course, it is impossible to quarrel in the abstract with the 
admirable goal of reducing delay and expense in the civil justice 
system. Whether the provisions prescribed for attaining this objec-
tive will achieve it in practice, however, remains uncertain. Several 
broad themes that run throughout the plan and the proposed local 
rules could prove problematic. 
One such theme is numerous arguable assumptions that ap-
parently underlie the plan. For instance, the plan assumes that ju-
dicial officers in the Montana District will have the requisite time, 
energy and inclination to micro-manage all non-exempted civil 
cases on their dockets in the close way that the plan contemplates. 
The plan also assumes that all attorneys will devote substantial 
time, effort and interest to researching and understanding their 
cases. It is possible that neither the judicial officers nor the lawyers 
will be able to discharge properly all of the responsibilities that the 
plan imposes. For example, it will take considerable effort for the 
judicial officers to be sufficiently steeped in the law and facts of 
each of their cases to prepare a discovery management plan for 
every one of them. Correspondingly, attorneys may experience dif-
ficulty complying with the plan's requirements that they prepare 
3. See United States District Court for the District of Montana, Civil Justice Expense 
and Delay Reduction Plan 1 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter Plan]. 
4. See id. at 3. See generally Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The 
New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770 (1981); Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 391-400 (1982). 
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and file pretrial statements and pre-discovery disclosure state-
ments as well as attend preliminary pretrial conferences.5 Imposing 
more responsibilities on lawyers, in terms of paper filings and par-
ticipating in activities, concomitantly promises to increase litiga-
tion delay and expense and to favor attorneys and clients who have 
greater resources. 6 
Another general theme in the plan and suggested local rules is 
the provision of rather inflexible time requirements and numerical 
limitations which were included in the apparent belief that judges 
and lawyers cannot be trusted to act responsibly. For instance, if a 
judicial officer fails to rule on a pending motion by a date certain, 
the clerk of court is to advise the officer of that fact and if the 
judicial officer does not decide within thirty days, the clerk is to 
report this delinquency to the chief judge. 7 Memoranda supporting 
motions will be restricted to twenty pages, while more than fifty 
interrogatories will be presumed excessive.8 
In addition to these broad themes, numerous specific aspects 
of the plan and proposed local rules could prove problematic. The 
possibility that lawyers and litigants will have to demand reassign-
ment of their cases to Article III judges from magistrate judges 
could adversely affect the relations between "repeat players" and 
the judicial officers, especially in a district that is as sparsely popu-
lated as the Montana District and which has so few active federal 
court practitioners.9 The potential for magistrate judges to share 
5. See Plan, supra note 3, at 10-13. These, and other requirements imposed, by virtue 
of the effort required to master and comply with them, may additionally reduce the alreaqy 
small size of the federal court bar. 
6. For example, preparing and filing statements, mentioned supra text accompanying 
note 5, will fall more heavily on those who possess limited resources. This correspondingly 
may mean that the requirements give the plan a pro-defendant tilt. See also Tobias, supra 
note 2, at 450-51. See generally Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. 
REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89). But cf. Plan, supra note 3, at 13 (judicial officer's role will be to 
assist counsel in developing case management plan that will preclude use of court process as 
strategic weapon). 
7. See Plan, supra note 3, at 20-21, 32. 
8. See id. at 20, 16. If interrogatories are the "poor litigant's discovery," restricting 
their number has the same effect as was discussed supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
9. See Plan, supra note 3, at 3-4. Each Article III judge in active service is to develop 
and implement a plan for assigning civil cases to magistrate judges, although it now appears 
that most of the Article III judges will assign cases on a co-equal basis. See id. Litigants are 
to be notified of their right to request reassignment to an Article III judge, but if parties fail 
to make a timely request that right will be deemed waived. Id. at 4. See generally Tobias, 
supra note 2, at 442-43. Requiring that litigants request timely reassignment or suffer 
waiver, rather than proceeding only after they have affirmatively consented, seems inconsis-
tent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Section 636(c)(l) provides for magistrates to exercise civil ju-
'risdiction "[u]pon the consent of the parties." Section 636(c)(2) states that parties shall be 
advised that "they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences." 
Most important, that subsection states that "rules of court for the reference of civil matters 
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the caseload could correspondingly foster "judicial officer 
shopping. " 10 
The creation of an expedited civil trial docket apparently 
would be an advance, if it can be implemented in practice. 11 Attor-
neys may encounter difficulty assembling their cases in the six-
month period prescribed, while judicial caseloads may not accom-
modate such a docket. 12 Before adopting this proposal, the Mon-
tana Federal District Court may want to review the situation in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, which is notorious for its "rocket 
docket," although that case-processing system has not been closely 
analyzed. 13 
The prescriptions governing mandatory pre-discovery disclo-
s·ure, which are "more extensive than the proposed amendments 
to" Federal Rule 26, 14 appear inadvisable, particularly because 
to magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties' consent." 
Id. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 73. 
The Senate Committee Report that accompanied passage of the CJRA also includes a 
passage which appears to cast doubt on this approach: 
While the legislation provides for the exercise of the full role of magistrates in the 
pretrial process, valid questions have been raised about the full extent of the mag-
istrates' constitutional authority. Indeed, three recent Supreme Court decisions, 
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. u. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982), 
Granfinanciera u. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989), and Gomez u. United States, 
109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), raise questions about what issues may be handled by non-
Article III judicial officers. Accordingly, the committee agrees with the recommen-
dation of the Federal Courts Study Committee (Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee (April 1990) at 80) that the Judicial Conference should conduct 
an indepth study of the constitutional parameters within which magistrates may 
properly exercise authority. 
See SENATE CoMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AcT OF 1990, S. Rep. No. 101-416, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6823 n. 10. 
10. I simply mean to say that a party could request reassignment because the litigant 
believes that an Article III judge is more likely than the magistrate judge to rule for the 
party on the merits. See also Tobias, supra note 2, at 442-43. See generally Resnik, House-
keeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 
(1990). 
11. See Plan, supra note 3, at 11, 14. 
12. The Plan seems to have anticipated these problems and attempts to allow for 
them. See id. at 11-12, 14. 
13. See Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW 
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 99, 101 (Summer 1991). See generally Report of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act Advisory Group for the Eastern District _of Virginia (Sept. 19, 1991). 
14." The plan "does not limit the disclosure to persons and documents that 'signifi-
cantly' bear upon the issues in the case. The elimination of any qualifying term will make it 
more difficult for a litigant or attorney lo avoid appropriate disclosure by relying upon the 
relative concept of significance." Plan, supra note 3, at 18 (citation omitted). See also Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Proposed Amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 87, 
87-88 (1991). 
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they could prove overly burdensome111 and because the controver-
sial nature of the proposed revision in Federal Rule 26 means that 
it is likely to be altered significantly.16 Nonetheless, the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act may authorize experimentation in specific districts 
with local rules that differ from the Federal Rules,17 and the Advi-
sory Committee has proposed an amendment to Federal Rule 83(b) 
that would have an analogous effect. 18 
Perhaps the most troubling feature of the plan is its proposal 
to establish in every division of the Montana District a peer review 
committee to review the litigation conduct and discovery practices 
of lawyers who practice before the court. 19 The committees would 
be comprised of practicing members of the bar to "be appointed by 
majority vote of the Article III judges of the district in active ser-
vice. "20 The committees would review discovery or litigation prac-
tices at the request of any judicial officer who is to provide them 
with a statement delineating the questioned practice.21 After con-
sidering the record, the committees would "present the judicial of-
ficer with an advisory opinion stating whether the practice or con-
duct falls within the bounds of accepted discovery or litigation 
practice. "22 
Little data appear to suggest that litigation or discovery abuse 
in the Montana District warrants corrective action, especially with 
a remedy as potentially severe as that proposed. Even if there were 
information showing that abuse's magnitude or seriousness is sub-
stantial, creation of these committees seems inadvisable. First, Ar-
ticle III judges may lack adequate authority to name such commit-
tees, although this seems to be a close question.23 Neither criteria 
15. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
16. Considerable opposition to the proposal was expressed in written public comments 
and at the hearings held by the Advisory Committee during November, 1991 in Los Angeles 
and during February, 1992 in Atlanta. · 
17. See SENATE CoMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AcT OF 1990, S. Rep. No. 
101-416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 14-32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6816-35. 
18. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Proposed Amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b), re-
printed in 137 F.R.D. at 153. See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 51-52 n.15. The Advi-
sory Committee, in formulating proposals to amend two provisions of Rule 26, also explicitly 
recognized that district courts might make exceptions to the federal provision by local rule. 
See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C), 26(b)(2), re-
printed in 137 F.R.D. at 89, 91-92. 
19. The court is to establish the committees "not later than June 30, 1992." Plan, 
supra note 3, at 17. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Federal judges have appointed all manner of adjuncts, such as special masters, 
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for appointment nor terms of service are prescribed. The plan 
seems to give the committees a roving commission to review any 
behavior that a judicial officer certifies to them. The committees 
would be charged with reviewing suspect conduct pursuant to a 
standard that is at best vague, and in any event too insubstan-
tial-"whether the practice or conduct falls within the bounds of 
accepted discovery or litigation practice."u For example, one law-
yer's professional behavior is another attorney's improper conduct, 
while it may be a judge's abusive activity. The plan makes little 
procedural provision, particularly in terms of due process. For in-
stance, some paper record is prescribed, but there is no provision 
for oral testimony, evidentiary presentation, or the right to chal-
lenge assertions in the paper record. The plan does not state 
whether a majority of the committees' members must agree, 
whether the committees' advisory opinions are to be in writing and 
how they are to be justified, and what will be the predicate if the 
committees find that the behavior certified is not acceptable. 211 
A few requirements relating to settlement also could pose 
problems. Mandating attendance at settlement negotiations by 
representatives of each litigant having authority to participate and 
effect a complete compromise may place undue pressure on certain 
parties, especially those with scarce resources. 26 The Advisory 
Group's recommendation that the judicial officer have discretion to 
preside over settlement conferences could have similar effects.27 
In conclusion, the civil justice plan developed by the Montana 
Federal District Court promises to reduce expense and delay in the 
amici and advisory committees, to assist them. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1300-01 (1976). Statutes or rules authorize most such 
appointments. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 53 (special masters). See also Levine, The Authority 
for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753 (1984). See generally Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 
281 (1989). The Supreme Court also recently recognized that the federal judiciary has a 
broad ambit in which it may exercise inherent judicial autltority to protect the court's own 
processes from litigation and discovery abuse. See Chambers v. Nasca, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 
(1991). See generally Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal 
Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 948-49 (1991). 
24. See Plan, supra note 3, at 17. 
25. See id. The predicate apparently would be some form of sanction. If so, that 
should be specifically stated. 
26. See id. at 22. The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §473(b)(5), now authorizes 
such compulsory attendance, although the question of whether courts had this authority 
had been highly controversial. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 
F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text. 
27. See Plan, supra note 3, at 22. Cf. Tobias, supra note 2, at 443-45 (discussion of 
problems that arise from affording judicial officers discretion to preside over settlement 
conferences). 
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civil litigation process. Nonetheless, certain components of the 
plan may not have those effects and some parts could well increase 
expense and delay. Montana attorneys, whether they practice often 
or infrequently in federal court, should scrutinize the plan, search 
for ways of improving it, and make their views known to the Mon-
tana federal district judges. With thorough, informed input, the 
Montana Federal District Court should be able to revise the plan 
in a way that will enable it to reduce cost and delay in the civil 
justice system most effectively. 
